Much as in previous recessions, the number of applications to public disability insurance programs increased sharply during the Great Recession. We find that the composition of applicants also changes across business cycles. For example, applicants during economic downturns, and especially during the Great Recession, are younger, better educated, higher income, and more likely to have recent work experience. However, we find only mixed evidence supporting the theory that the increase in applications in downturns is caused by healthier applicants who apply to disability programs only because they are unemployed.
Introduction
The Great Recession has led to the loss of more than 7.5 million jobs since it began in December 2007, affecting Americans of all ages and education levels. At the same time, applications to two public disability programs, Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and its means-tested counterpart, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), have risen to unprecedented levels. More than 3 million new SSDI applications were filed in 2010, an increase of almost 35 percent in just three years (SSA 2011) . SSDI applications normally rise during economic downturns -there were 13 percent year-over-year increases in the first year of both of the last two recessions (1990 to 1991 and 2000 to 2001) -but the current rate of increase in disability claims dwarfs previous upticks. In addition, while applications normally fall during periods of economic growth, SSDI claims increased for all but one year of the 2000s, so the current spike adds to an already-high level of SSDI activity. Similar patterns, albeit smaller in magnitude, are evident in the SSI disabled rolls.
This relationship between the business cycle and the number of public disability program applications has been well-documented (e.g., Autor and Duggan 2006) . We expand on this work by exploring the relationship between the individual characteristics of applicants and awardees to SSDI and SSI during the Great Recession to those of applicants and awardees immediately before the downturn.
There are a variety of ways in which the incentives to apply for disability benefits may change for working-age adults with persistent health problems during a recession. Laid-off workers may find that, even though the public disability program's application process does not change, the opportunity costs associated with the 5-month unemployment requirement do.
Losing one's job might also make it easier to meet the means test for SSI eligibility.
1 Further, there may be interactions between the macroeconomy and the trade-offs between applying and remaining in the labor market. For example, in a recession individuals may think they are more likely to be awarded public disability benefits than to find a new job when so many other unemployed workers are looking. Workers who retain their job may fear another round of layoffs, experience a real or nominal wage cut, or grow unhappy putting in longer or more stressful hours to make up for their shrinking number of coworkers. Also, the stress caused by a poor economic climate could worsen both physical and mental health to the point of disability, 1 SSI only looks back one month in determining whether someone qualifies the income-test.
2 especially with anxiety and depression increasingly becoming the diagnosis for public disability claims (Gallo et al. 2009 ).
Using were more widespread than in the past (Farber 2011) , resulting in larger increases in the unemployment rates of well-educated workers, a group that is generally less likely to apply. In addition, long-term joblessness has become much more common during the current downturn, which makes SSDI application more attractive (and more likely to be successful, as employability is a factor in judging applications), though extensions in unemployment insurance benefits have likely delayed the decision to apply for SSDI (Lindner 2011 , Rutledge 2011 ).
Finally, because of the high disability application and allowance rates over the last decade, the most vulnerable -the infirmed near-elderly and those individuals who have clear-cut physical and mental defects -may already be receiving benefits and have left the labor market before the onset of this recession.
We compare applicants across the business cycle based on three characteristics of the applicants: demographics (race, education, gender, marital status, health), income, and job characteristics at the last job worked prior to application (hours worked, industry, occupation).
Interestingly, we find inconsistent evidence that the health composition of applicants is sensitive to the business cycle. Great Recession applicants are significantly less likely to have had work
limitations, but in all other measures are not observably healthier than applicants during economic booms. But applicants during the recessions, especially the Great Recession, are younger, better educated, higher income, and more likely to have held a full-time job when first observed in the data than those who apply during expansions. As a result of differences in these non-health characteristics, the predicted application, award, and allowance rates are much lower than those observed during the Great Recession.
The paper continues as follows. Section 1 discusses the literature on disability insurance decisions and the macroeconomy. Section 2 discusses the application decision. Section 3 discusses the data, and Section 4 presents the empirical models. Section 5 presents the results.
Section 6 concludes that while some of the increases in application and allowance rates can be explained by observable characteristics and the macroeconomy, much of it cannot. The incentives to apply, and the prospects for successful application, differ substantially in a severe downturn like the Great Recession. Together with the fact that there have been no programmatic changes in the disability programs in the 2000s, these results suggest there have been fundamental changes over the last decade in the way that people apply to disability and in the way these applications are evaluated.
Disability Programs and the Macroeconomy
Both SSDI and SSI are disability programs administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA) and using the same 5-step disability determination process, but they are designed to serve different populations.
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Social Security Disability Insurance. SSDI is a public disability program that provides insurance to current and recent workers who face a work-limiting disability expected to last at least 12 months. Individuals are eligible for SSDI benefits if they are not currently earning more than the Substantial Gainful Activity level due to a disability and will be unable to do so for at least a year. Applicants must have worked long enough and recently enough to be SSDI-insured; that is, one must have worked a total of (age 22) quarters and have worked 20 quarters in the last 10 years. 3,4 Individuals have a 5-month waiting period between disability onset and the potential start of benefits. Beneficiaries are eligible for Medicare 29 months after disability onset. SSDI benefits are a function of an individual's earnings history, using the same formula as Social Security retirement benefits, without an actuarial adjustment for early receipt of benefits; 4 disabled individuals get their full Social Security retirement benefit in perpetuity, as if they had retired at their Full Retirement Age.
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Numerous studies have established that disability applications increase during periods of rising unemployment. 6 Work by SSA (1988) finds that economic differences play a significant role in explaining the differences in SSDI application rates among the states. Rupp and Stapleton (1995) find that a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate leads to 2-7 percent more disability applications, albeit fewer awards. Autor and Duggan (2003) find an even larger response to the unemployment rate after the disability liberalization of 1984. Duggan and Imberman (2009) explore the relationship between applications and the unemployment rate and also find a strong positive relationship, but they do not control for other potentially confounding factors such as age or whether the potential applicant is SSDI-insured. Cutler, Meara, and Richards-Shubik (2012) find that while the increase in the disability application rate during the Great Recession is in line with expectations given the depth of the downturn, the increase is inconsistent with either an increase in health shocks or a decrease in the opportunity cost of application.
While changes over time in SSDI applications have been the focus of frequent analyses, few studies examine how the composition of applicants changes due to macroeconomic conditions. Stapleton and Dietrich (1995) find that the initial allowance rate -the proportion of applications that were successful without appeals -fell during the years immediately following an unemployment rate increase; this finding is consistent with the hypothesis that healthier individuals are induced to apply during periods of high joblessness. Martin and Davies (2004) examine how the composition of disability applicants and beneficiaries had changed between 1984 and 1999, compared to the overall population changes, similar to our descriptive analysis.
However, the focus of their work was comparing these two points in time -not the role of the macroeconomy. Lahiri, Song, and Wixon (2008) find heterogeneous effects of the unemployment rate on disability application by gender -in particular, low-wage men are more responsive to downturns than women.
5 Individuals may be terminated from the disability program due to medical recovery or by earnings that exceed the SGA under certain conditions. "Medical recovery" is determined through continuing disability reviews (CDRs), whose use has varied widely over time. Stapleton et al. (2010) find that only 4 percent of 1996 SSDI awardees had their benefits terminated for work in the first ten years in the program. Coe and Rupp (2012) find that approximately 1 percent of SSDI beneficiaries leave the rolls per year either due to work effort or medical recovery. 6 See Rupp and Stapleton (1995) for a survey of earlier studies estimating the effect of changes in the unemployment rate on the SSDI application rate.
Supplemental Security Income. SSI is a means-tested disability program for which individuals with low income and assets, and a work-limiting disability are eligible. The disability criteria are the same as the SSDI program. The SSI benefit depends on the household's or individual's income but generally can be thought of as raising the beneficiary to the poverty line -the benefits are typically higher than the benefits available through Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) but lower than the full retirement benefits available through SSDI. 7 SSI recipients also receive Medicaid coverage immediately upon first benefit receipt. Recent work suggests some substitutability, especially among children, for SSI enrollment and TANF participation.
8
In contrast to the SSDI program, there has been relatively little research examining how the SSI program is related to the business cycle. The existing research that does exist supports the hypothesis that SSI applications are less responsive to the business cycle. A series of papers suggest that SSI applications were more responsive to the business cycle before welfare reform of 1996, and that applications are more responsive than receipts. 9 Recent evidence of a link between SSI and the macroeconomy is mixed. Autor and Duggan (2003) note that the state-level changes in SSI participation, unlike SSDI, are unrelated to changes in labor force participation among high school dropouts. Black et al. (2002) find that SSI participation is positively related to earning shocks, though much less so than SSDI participation. Garrett and Glied (2000) and Schmidt and Sevak (2004) find a negative relationship between unemployment rates and SSI caseloads, though Schmidt (2012) finds that this correlation is less negative -and not significantly different from zero -after welfare reform.
This paper is among the first analyses of disability activity during the Great Recession.
In addition, it considers not just the overall response of disability applications to macroeconomic conditions but also how the composition of applicants and their ultimate success change at different points in the business cycle. Schmidt and Sevak (2004) , Pavetti and Kauff (2006) , Kubik (1999) , Coe and Rutledge (2012) . 9 See Rupp and Stapleton (1995) , Stapleton et al. (1998) , Stapleton et al. (1999) .
Public Disability Program Application Decisions and the Business Cycle
In theory, an individual's decision to apply for disability is a simple matter of weighing the costs and benefits of application: one applies if the expected benefit would increase the expected present value of lifetime utility. 10 Workers who apply must weigh their current earnings and future labor market opportunities against the future stream of disability benefits (plus health insurance coverage), times the probability of being accepted to the program, minus any costs of application.
11 The value of the decision can be expressed as V t = V t (E t ) where E t , employment status at time t, equals zero if the decision in the current period is to work, one if the individual applies for disability, two if he decides not to work or apply. The value of working will equal this period's utility, which is derived from labor market earnings, W t ; leisure time when working,
; and the effort of work which is a function of health, e(h), plus the discounted value of facing employment and application decisions next period, where  is the discount factor.
If the individual applies for disability, he faces a probability that his claim will be accepted, which is a function of his underlying health. The value of applying for disability is the weighted sum of the underlying utilities based on the outcome of the application, minus the application costs, c.
12 If the claim is accepted, the individual receives current utility from leisure when not working, , and the disability cash benefit received, plus the discounted value of future disability benefit (and Medicare) receipt. If the claim is denied, the individual receives current utility from leisure when not working and non-wage, non-disability benefit income, I t , when the individual is not in receipt of benefits, plus the discounted value of facing the 7 employment decision next period when he must decide whether to appeal, work, or remain unemployed.
Finally, the utility from non-work is simply the current utility from leisure while not working and non-wage, non-disability benefit income, I t , when the individual is not in receipt of benefits, plus the discounted value of facing the employment decision next period when he must decide whether to apply, work, or remain unemployed.
The individual's decision will be affected by health status, which influences the probability of acceptance to disability and the costs of working. Age is also a factor because it influences the probability of acceptance, 13 potential wages, and possibly the disutility of work.
The type of job could also influence the disability decision by affecting the disutility of work.
Business Cycle. The business cycle enters into the decision to apply for disability benefits in numerous ways. First and foremost, it impacts the value of the outside option of potential employment. In recessions, a worker may lose his job, may perceive his job to be more unstable and a replacement job harder to find when there are many other displaced workers unemployed and searching. This would make individuals more likely to apply, whether they have lost their jobs or not, since their income stream from work may have decreased and uncertainty has increased.
A second way that the business cycle may directly impact the application decision is through the inability to work while the application is pending. During economic booms, when work is relatively easy to come by, pulling out of the labor market and waiting anywhere from a few months to over 4 years for the application to be processed could mean a lot of foregone 8 income.
14 However, if one is already out of the labor market and not earning income, being forbidden to work while waiting for a decision may not represent a substantial change to the income stream.
The business cycle also can influence the disability application rate through the unemployment insurance (UI) program. UI, a federal-state partnership program based on federal law, is administered at the state level. The duration of the benefits is typically 26 weeks but that has been extended during past recessions to as much as 59 weeks, and, during the Great Recession, to as much as 99 weeks in the hardest-hit states. Recent work by Rutledge (2011) finds that SSDI applications increase in the month of UI benefits are exhausted. This unprecedented extension has a dampening effect on the cyclicality of disability applications for two reasons. First, longer UI benefit durations reduce job search effort. Second, longer UI extensions may lead to a higher-quality match in the ensuing job (Caliendo, Tatsiramos, and
Since SSI is a means-tested program, there is likely a mechanical relationship between SSI eligibility and the macroeconomy. As incomes decline, more individuals will fall below the program's income limits. The longer the downturn lasts, the more people will also likely qualify under the asset limit.
Finally, health or disability status itself may be impacted by the macroeconomy. Though the literature often finds a positive relationship between health and the unemployment rate (Ruhm 2000) , others contend that health improvements in a recession are mostly tied to short-run mortality, and that recessions worsen health over the long run (Sullivan and von Wachter 2009 , Gallo et al. 2009 , Stevens et al. 2011 , Coile et al. 2012 ). If health declines, then one would expect higher probabilities of application and allowance.
Data
14 The length of time for a final disability determination depends on how many appeals one makes. An audit study performed by the Office of the Inspector General (2008) found that in 2006 the average processing time for cases in the initial determination phase was 131 days. A denied individual has the right to appeal at this point, which can add considerable time to the final determination. For cases reaching the appeals phases, the audit study reports that the average time was 279 days for reconsideration, 811 days for cases going to the Administrative Law Judge, 1,053 days for cases going to the SSA Appeals Council and 1,720 days for Federal Court cases. Maestas, Mullen and Strand (2012) use administrative data and find that roughly one-third of applications are allowed at the initial determination phase, and 38 percent of the rejections do not appeal the decision. For the remaining cases, just under a third made it to the Administrative Law Judge level, less than 5% of cases progressed to the Appeals Council level and less than 1% of cases progressed to Federal Court. [1942] [1943] [1944] [1945] [1946] [1947] , and Early Baby Boomers (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) . We examine disability insurance applications every two years starting with the 2000
wave, though we also use the 1996 and 1998 waves to gather information on some respondents prior to their benefit application. The sample is comprised of respondents between age 50 and their Full Retirement Age (FRA) of 65 or 66 during the 2000-2010 waves.
Applications to and benefit receipts from disability insurance programs are based on selfreported information from HRS respondents. Due to changes in the wording of questions and confusion on the part of the respondents, it can be difficult to disentangle whether the respondents are applying for SSDI, SSI, or both programs at the same time. To determine this, we match the survey data to the restricted Summary Earnings File, made available by the SSA.
The earnings file includes all Social Security-covered earnings between 1951 and the last time the respondent gave SSA permission to match to the restricted data. 15 The administrative data allow us to determine whether applicants are insured for SSDI benefits at any point in time. If the respondent was uncertain whether he had applied for SSDI or SSI, or the RAND files indicate a probable incorrect response, we assume that individuals who are eligible for SSDI applied for SSDI, because the financial benefit is significantly higher than SSI and the disability determination criteria are identical.
We also use self-reported income information to identify who has a successful application. This is right-censored for some applicants, since their cases were still pending at the last interview, though only 38 of the 528 applications between 2001 and 2010 (excluding 2007) were pending. 15 Approximately 70 percent of the respondents have given permission. Previous work has concluded that using the matched sample does not introduce bias (Kapteyn et al. 2006 ). (2008-2010 period) . 16 After excluding person-periods with invalid matches to the SSA data and with previous disability applications, 88,697 person-period observations remain in the sample, among whom 2,431 applied to SSDI and 1,317 applied to SSI.
Survey of Income and Program

Methodology
We compare SSDI and SSI applicants and recipients in the Great Recession to those in the prior recession and the intervening expansion using two different methods.
First, using both the HRS and the SIPP Gold Standard File, we estimate a probit regression using one observation per person and per time period:
The dependent variable, , is one of a series of indicators of disability insurance activity for person i in period p. For each program -SSDI and SSI -we estimate three models: application conditional on eligibility, award conditional on eligibility, and award conditional on application.
We also estimate another set of these three regressions for applying or being awarded any disability benefits, regardless of which program received the application. Using the SIPP sample only, we decompose the change in the probability of applying for, or being awarded, disability benefits between two periods, using an adaptation of the BlinderOaxaca decomposition technique for nonlinear models (Fairlie 2005) . The linear BlinderOaxaca decomposition (Blinder 1973 , Oaxaca 1973 begins from the observation that the difference in the average value of an outcome variable between two groups -using an example from this project, SSDI application in the mid-2000's expansion (period 2) versus the Great Recession (period 3). It can be written as:
can be rewritten as:
by adding and subtracting both ̅ and ̅ to the right-hand side. In these equations, ̅ is a matrix of mean values for all explanatory variables for individuals in period ∈ 2, 3 , is the coefficient from an OLS regression of on for individuals in period w only, and is the coefficient from a pooled regression of on for individuals in either period (Neumark 1988) . 20 The first term on the right-hand side of equation (1) is the explained portion of the gap between and ; that is, how much the observable differences between individuals in the two time periods contribute to the difference in disability application probabilities. The latter two terms together represent the unexplained portion, or the contribution of the difference in the responses to individual characteristics between the two periods.
Since our outcome variables are dichotomous, we adopt Fairlie's (2005) extension of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for nonlinear models. Where , in a non-linear equation, does not simply equal ̅ . Instead, ∑ . Therefore, the nonlinear analogue to equation (1) is:
13 .
As before, the first term is the explained portion, and the combination of the latter two terms is the unexplained portion.
For each variable in , we calculate the contribution to the explained portion of the change in the disability application or allowance rate; we also calculate the total unexplained change in the outcome variable. To calculate each separate variable's contribution to the explained portion, we find the difference in the average predicted probability of application (or award) when replacing the distribution of each variable in period 2 with that variable's period 3 distribution, holding all other variables constant. Standard errors are calculated using the Delta Method.
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Results
Health and Retirement Study. Table 3 presents the mean characteristics of individuals who apply for disability benefits by the point in the business cycle in which they apply. Despite the limited age range of the HRS sample -50-66 -we see differences in the average age of applicants. Individuals who apply during either recession are approximately one year older, with an average age of 58.6, than those who applied during the intervening boom. Individuals who apply during recessions are also more likely to be college educated. Interestingly, we find a declining trend over time in the percent of applicants of Hispanic origin.
We also compare disability applicants' incomes relative to the federal poverty threshold, and categorize applicants by wealth based on the cut-off points among the wealth quintiles in We also compare the characteristics of the jobs that individuals reported having within the last two years before applying to a disability program. Approximately 60 percent of the sample of applicants was not working for pay prior to application -except during the Great Recession, when less than half of the applicants were not employed in the previous wave We also observe differences in the types of employment among those who have jobs. Individuals applying for disability benefits during recessions are less likely to have been working in a parttime job and are more likely to be working in a full-time job before applying for disability benefits.
Finally, we examine whether individuals report having limitations with any activities of daily living or instrumental activities of daily living, and any reported psychological problems.
We also assess any differences in the mobility index, the CESD-8 index, and a count of large muscle impairment. 22 There are noticeable increases over time and across booms and busts in the percent of applicants reporting mobility problems, large-muscle problems, and psychological problems. Life expectancy, as measured by the ratio of the self-reported probability of living until age 75 to the statistical probability of living that long, is relatively stable. Interestingly, the average self-reported life expectancy is quite low, with individuals reporting probabilities of living until age 75 -that life expectancy is 65-70 percent lower than the life-table would predict. 22 The ADL activities include bathing, dressing, eating, getting in/out of bed and walking across a room. The IADL activities include using a telephone, taking medications, handling money, shopping and preparing meals. The psychological problem indicator reports whether the respondent was ever diagnosed with an emotional, nervous or psychiatric problems. The mobility index includes four tasks: walking several blocks, walking one block, climbing several flights of stairs and walking one flight of stairs. The large muscle impairment index also includes four tasks: sitting for two hours, getting up from a chair, stopping/kneeling/crouching and pushing/pulling a large object. The CESD-8 index is the sum of six "negative" and two "positive" indicators of experiencing a sentiment all or most of the time. The sentiments are: felt depressed, everything is an effort, restless sleep, felt alone, felt sad, could not get going, felt happy and enjoyed life. Table 4 presents the marginal effects from three fully interacted probit models. The first set of columns models the decision to apply to either disability program, among the population potentially eligible ("application rate"). The second set of columns models the awardees among the eligible population ("award rate"), and the third set models the awardees among the subset of individuals who decided to apply ("allowance rate"). These three specifications allow us to examine how characteristics among applicants and awardees have changed with the business cycle, and to decompose any observed differences to see if it is happening at the application or the award stage of the process.
The first column, not surprisingly, shows that health conditions are positively related to applying, since they influence the probability of acceptance onto a disability program.
Individuals working at the beginning of each three-year period are less likely to apply, and men are more likely to apply. While a larger SSI benefit increases the probability of applying to a disability program, a larger SSDI benefit actually decreases the probability of applying; this variable is likely picking up the effect of lifetime income that is not already controlled for in the wealth and current income variables.
Interestingly, we do not find evidence of large increases in overall disability program applications during recessions once we control for observable characteristics, as evidenced by the insignificant marginal effects on the time period indicator variables, nor has the composition changed consistently across business cycles. We do, however, find some evidence that the pool of applicants has changed over time, independent of macroeconomic conditions. Higher income individuals, those with higher SSI benefits, and those age 62 and over are more likely to apply for benefits during the 2001-2003 recession than during the expansion. But for each variable the opposite is true for the Great Recession, when applicants also are more likely to have recently worked full time. In addition, a higher SSDI benefit is associated with the increased prevalence of applications during the Great Recession, either because applicants have increased sensitivity to financial incentives or more applicants have higher lifetime income. But there is no statistically significant evidence that healthier individuals are more likely to apply during either recession.
When we examine who is accepted onto the disability rolls, we find a very similar story.
As expected, having a mobility problem is positively associated with being awarded disability benefits. Recent work experience is negatively correlated with disability awards, as is higher net In contrast to the HRS results, there is some evidence in the SIPP results that healthier people are more likely to apply for disability during the recent recession than during the 23 Results are similar when examining SSDI and SSI separately. SSDI applicants during the Great Recession are more likely to be male and have worked recently, and SSDI awardees are more likely than other applicants to be men, Hispanics, and white-collar workers in the most recent period. Older individuals are more likely to apply to SSI during the Great Recession, and individuals with longer work histories or more recent full-time work experience were less likely to be awarded SSI benefits given that they applied during the Great Recession. These results are available from the authors upon request. Not surprisingly, wealth and income are highly negatively correlated with applications.
Unlike the 2001-2003 recession, the Great Recession experiences a statistically significant increase in applications by those in higher income quintiles and in the third and fourth quintiles of the wealth distribution. Awards as a proportion of the eligible population are more likely at higher net worth levels in each recession, but awards conditional on application are significantly less likely at higher income quintiles during the Great Recession.
The estimates for other characteristics confirm patterns that were observed in the descriptive data for the Great Recession. Applicants during this period are more likely to be male and are a statistically significant 5.1 percent less likely to report a work limitation the first time they are observed, compared to applicants during the expansion. Fewer awardees also report work limitations, though this appears to be due to increased applications and not an increase in allowance conditional on application. Awardees are also less likely to be black, and more likely to be college educated and have smaller families during the Great Recession.
24 Table 7 reports the non-linear Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions for both programs combined. 25 The first two lines report the unconditional probability of applying, being awarded 24 Separate analysis for SSDI and SSI reveals that the change in the age distribution of applicants is from SSDI, but changed for both SSDI and SSI among awardees. Similarly, both SSDI and SSI applications increased in the Great Recession among higher income or wealthier individuals; the increase in SSI application is indicative of steep declines in financial well-being from the peak to the trough of the business cycle. These results are available from the authors upon request. 25 Patterns for SSDI and SSI separately are very similar. These decompositions are available from the authors upon request.
In the expansion bookmarked by the recessions of 2001-03 and 2008-10, the application rate rises slightly. About 70 percent of the increase in the application rate during the expansion is explained by differences in the characteristics of potential applicants, primarily the aging of the population, since increases in education and wealth and a decrease in work limitations all suggest that the application rate should have been lower in 2008-2010 than in the previous recession. The award rate also increased during the expansion, but the increases are much larger than those in the application rate. The explained portion of this increase is actually negative, as aging is swamped by other personal characteristics. About half of the allowance rate can be explained-and about half of that comes from the aging population.
The application rate rises from 2.9 to 3.6 percent on average in the period between the expansion of 2004-06 and the Great Recession. Just over 40 percent of this increase can be explained by differences in explanatory variables between the beginnings of each period, due almost entirely to changes in the age and wealth distributions. The award rate rises from 1.2 to 1.8 percent; here, the increase suggested by the age distribution is overwhelmed by the decrease suggested by the high unemployment rates, so the unexplained portion is higher than the actual rise. Finally, the allowance rate rises from 40.5 to 49.6 percent, with just less than a quarter of that rise explained by individual characteristics; the age and income distributions, along with job characteristics, together account for most of this portion.
Conclusions
Not only does the number of disability applicants increase during a recession, but the composition of these applicants also changes with the macroeconomy. Interestingly, we find some support for the idea that an economic downturn induced healthier individuals to apply to disability programs: although the health characteristics of applicants to be independent of the business cycle in the HRS, applicants in the SIPP were significantly less likely to have work limitations before the downturn. A more unequivocal change between expansions and contractions is the recent attachment to the labor force. Individuals who apply during recessions are more likely to have a recent work history and to have worked full-time than those who apply during booms. Applicants during the Great Recession also had higher incomes and wealth and more educational attainment when first observed than those who applied during the expansion.
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When we decompose the increase in application rate, award rate, and allowance rate experienced during the Great Recession, we find that a substantial portion of the increase in disability activity remains unexplained by the demographic composition and economic circumstances faced by potential applicants and awardees. The characteristics of the population -specifically, the graying of the baby boom generation and declining wealth -account for less than half of the increase in the application rate in the Great Recession, and only one quarter of the increase in the allowance rate. In contrast to the substantial increase in the award rate since 2006, our estimates suggest that, given the severity of the recent recession and declining reports of work limitations, the award rate should have actually decreased.
The severity of the Great Recession resulted in a very different marginal disability applicant than during the expansion or even the previous downturn. Better educated and better paid workers who normally avoid the disability program because of the high opportunity cost of leaving the workforce to apply were induced by high unemployment to apply between 2008 and 2010. This shift would suggest a decline in the award and allowance rates, but in actuality more of these applications have been successful. While this low explanatory power could be due to model misspecification, it is difficult to imagine what factors are omitted that could explain such substantial changes over time in the application rate, allowance rate and award rate. Together with the fact that there have been no substantial programmatic changes to the disability programs, we interpret our findings as evidence of a substantive shift over the last decade in how the disability application decision and the disability awards have been made, which cannot be explained by observable characteristics of the applicants. Source: Health and Retirement Study, 1996-2010 Health and Retirement Study, 1996-2010 
